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What Do We Think About Muslims? 
The Validity of Westerners’ Implicit 
Theories About the Associations 
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In a series of three studies, we investigated the validity of implicit theories that the German 
public holds regarding Muslims. German participants expected Muslims to be more aggressive 
than Christians, and therefore be more supportive of terrorism than Christians. Furthermore, 
Muslims were assumed to be more intrinsically religious and to hold a stronger identity with 
their religion than Christians (Study 1). However, self-assessment surveys of Muslims and 
Christians in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS: ex-Soviet Union) revealed that 
Muslims were not more aggressive, more intrinsically religious, or more supportive of terrorism 
than Christians. In contrast, Muslims reported a stronger religious identifi cation than Christians 
(Study 2). Correspondingly, threat to religious identity was found to affect only Muslims’, but 
not Christians’, attitudes toward terrorism conducted by outgroup perpetrators. In contrast to 
Germans’ implicit theories regarding Muslims, it was the importance of religious identity and 
not increased aggression potential that mediated this effect (Study 3). 
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Over the past 5 years, prolifi c and devastating 
terrorist  attacks conducted by Is lamic 
fundamentalists in America (mostly notably 
the World Trade Center attack of September 
11, 2001), the European Union (e.g. the train 
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bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004; the 
London underground attack in July, 2005), Asia 
(e.g. the Bali bombings of October 12, 2002) 
and the Middle East (e.g. almost daily attacks 
and suicide bombings in Iraq and Israel) against 
Western interests and rival Islamic groups 
have dramatically changed the global political 
climate and are likely to have heavily impacted 
on the general perception that Westerners hold 
regarding Muslims. As a consequence of these 
frequent and recent terrorist attacks conducted 
by Islamic fundamentalists, in addition to other 
factors such as frequent media reports on ter-
rorist attacks or political justifi cations of West-
ern counterterrorist activity (e.g. ‘War on terror’ 
in Afghanistan and Iraq; ‘Operation Enduring 
Freedom’), specifi c implicit theories and stereo-
types of ‘how Muslims really are’ relative to 
Christians may have emerged within western 
Christian societies. First of all, Muslims might 
be expected to be more intrinsically religious 
than Christians because many fundamentalists 
have died (and are willing to sacrifi ce them-
selves) as suicide bombers in the name of their 
religion. Second, religious identity might be 
more important to Muslims than Christians, 
because many Muslim nations do not distinguish 
between church and state and thus try to prevent 
secularization. Third, because of frequent suicide 
bombings in Israel and Iraq, the broadcast exe-
cutions of Americans and hostages of other 
nationalities in Iraq, and public proclamations by 
Muslim terrorist leaders (e.g. Osama Bin Laden) 
to fi ght the enemies of ‘the true faith’, Christians 
might expect Muslims to be extraordinarily 
aggressive. Fourth, and fi nally, because most of 
the recent spate of terrorist attacks were con-
ducted by Islamic extremists, and due to other 
powerful media images such as those showing 
Muslims celebrating the attacks on the World 
Trade Center, Muslims might be expected to 
be more supportive of terrorism as a justifi ed 
political instrument than Christians.1
Why is it important to know more about 
Westerners’ implicit theories of Muslims? 
Implicit theories are construction frameworks 
that people use in everyday life to interpret and 
evaluate their social world (Dweck, Chiu, & 
Hong, 1995; Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001), guide 
social judgments, and develop social actions 
(Levy, 1999; Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 
2001). If members of Western Christian societies 
really subscribe to the above-mentioned implicit 
theories on Muslims, it could have far ranging 
and serious consequences for the understanding 
of and social interaction with the Islamic world. 
An assumption by Christians that Muslims are 
extraordinarily aggressive or inclined towards 
terrorism could be expected to lead to a different 
attitude toward Muslims than an assumption that 
they are placid people who generally condemn 
terrorism. 
Because religiously motivated terrorism is 
one of the biggest social challenges facing 
modern Western societies at the present time, 
in this study we primarily focused on expected 
and actual attitudes of Muslims and Christians 
toward terrorism, as well as the underlying psy-
chological mechanisms propelling these percep-
tions and attitudes. We report on three studies 
that investigated: Germans’ implicit theories 
on Muslims and Christians (Study 1); tested 
their validity with self-assessment surveys of 
Muslims and Christians in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS: ex-Soviet Union) 
(Study 2); and fi nally pointed out the specifi c 
role of religious identity in attitudes toward ter-
rorism as a political instrument (Study 3).
Study 1
Germans in Munich, Bavaria—a predominantly 
Catholic and arguably the most conservative 
of German states—were asked about their 
perceptions of Christians and Muslims living 
in the CIS (which contains countries like 
Azerbaijan, whose population is 95% Muslim 
and which is located near Iran) in terms of 
their religiousness, importance of religious 
identity, aggression potential, and attitudes 
toward terrorism. Compared to Christians, we 
assumed that Germans expected Muslims to be: 
(a) more intrinsically religious; (b) more strongly 
religiously identifi ed; (c) more aggressive; and 
(d) more accepting of terrorism. We expected 
these perceptions to be independent of whether 
German participants were of a Christian de-
nomination or not. If our assumption was 
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correct, then the expected effects should not be 
likely due to processes of social identity related 
to religious affi liation (Tajfel, 1982). In other 
words, expected effects should not be mainly 
based on German Christians stereotyping of 
Muslims because they consider the latter to be 
a religious outgroup.
Method
Participants and design In total, 119 passers-by 
at a pedestrian zone (67 females and 52 males, 
ages ranging from 15 to 66 years; M = 32.49, 
SD = 14.17) participated in Study 1, which was 
based on a 2 (religion of target group: Christian 
vs. Muslim) × 2 (denomination of participants: 
Christian vs. no denomination) factorial between-
subject design.
Material and procedure Participants were re-
cruited at a pedestrian zone near the Ludwigs-
Maximilians-University Munich campus and 
asked whether they would be willing to partici-
pate in a study dealing with attitudes towards 
different religions. If they agreed, they were led 
to an experimental lab at the nearby University 
campus and read the following synopsis:
Religion is an important part of many societies and 
many peoples’ daily life. Therefore, it is important to 
learn as much as possible about religion in different 
cultures. In the present study, we are interested in 
your perception of Muslims (Christians) in the CIS 
(ex-Soviet Union). 
Subsequently, participants estimated Muslims’ 
(Christians’) aggression potential using a German 
translation of an aggression questionnaire by 
Buss and Perry (1992). This translation was 
modifi ed from a fi rst-person to a third-person 
perspective (α = .93). Next (and in keeping 
with single-item measurement of attitudes), par-
ticipants were asked on a scale from 0 (not at all) 
to 10 (extremely) to what extent they supposed 
that Muslims (Christians) condone terrorism as a 
justifi ed political instrument. Lastly, participants 
reported to what extent they assumed that religious 
identity is important to Muslims (Christians) 
(0 = not at all important; 10 = extremely important). 
The distinction between religiosity and religious
identity is useful, because religiosity concerns 
the degree of a person’s religious participation 
whereas, by contrast, religious identity concerns 
the affi liation of a person with a certain religious 
group (see Regnerus, 2003, who also measured 
importance of religious identity using a single 
item). Finally, participants were asked to assess 
Muslims’ (Christians’) degree of intrinsic 
religiosity (α = .61) in a German translation 
(Zwingmann, Hellmeister, & Ochsmann, 1994) of 
the religious orientation scale by Feagin (1964). 
Because intrinsic religiosity is the measure for 
‘real’ and lived religiosity (Allport & Ross, 
1967; Bergin, 1991; Hill & Pargament, 2003), 
we only used intrinsic religiosity as a measure of 
religiosity (as opposed to extrinsic religiosity). 
Finally, participants indicated in open-ended 
question format their own religious denomination, 
were informed about the actual aim of the 
investigation, and were dismissed.
Results and Discussion
A 2 × 2 × 4 factorial multivariate analysis of vari-
ance (MANOVA) with ‘religion of target group’ 
(Muslims vs. Christians) and ‘denomination 
of participants’ (Christian vs. none) as between-
participant factors, and intrinsic religiosity, 
importance of religious identity, aggression 
potential and attitudes toward terrorism as 
dependent variables, revealed a significant 
main effect for ‘religion of target group’ (multi-
variate F(4, 112) = 9.25, p < .001, η2 = .25). All 
means and standard deviations are reported 
in Table 1. Univariate follow-up analyses revealed 
that Muslims (compared to Christians) were ex-
pected to be more intrinsically religious (F(1, 
115) = 20.29, p < .001, η2 = .15), to have a greater 
religious identifi cation (F(1, 115) = 8.35, p < .01, 
η2 = .07), to be more aggressive (F(1, 115) = 5.69, 
p = .02, η2 = .05), and to be more supportive of
terrorism as a justifi ed political instrument 
(F(1, 115) = 15.66, p < .001, η2 = .12). No signifi -
cant interaction was observed between ‘reli-
gion of target group’ and ‘denomination of 
participants’ (multivariate F(4, 112) = 0.60, 
p > .66, η2 = .02), indicating that the effects 
reported above were probably not mainly due 
to processes of social categorization by (or 
due to issues of social identity of) German 
Christians (compared to non-Christian German 
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participants) of a religious outgroup such as 
Muslims.
Mediational analysis A mediational analysis 
that followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) medi-
ation criteria was conducted in order to investi-
gate whether Muslims were expected to be 
more accepting of terrorism because they were 
assumed to be extraordinarily: (a) aggressive; 
(b) intrinsically religious; or (c) strongly iden-
tifi ed with their religion. Preliminary regression 
analyses revealed that only the assumed aggres-
sion potential was a potential mediator for 
different expectations about Christians’ and 
Muslims’ attitudes toward terrorism. First of 
all, a regression analysis with the experimental 
condition ‘religion of target group’ as a predictor 
variable and the dependent variable ‘attitudes 
toward terrorism’ as a criterion variable revealed 
a signifi cant regression weight (β = –.44; t(117) 
= –5.22, p < .001). Second, a regression analysis 
with ‘religion of target group’ as a predictor 
and the assumed mediator ‘expected aggression 
potential’ as a criterion variable also revealed a 
signifi cant regression weight (β = –.33; t(117) 
= –3.81, p < .001). Third, a regression analysis 
with the assumed mediator ‘expected aggression 
potential’ as a predictor and the dependent 
variable ‘attitudes toward terrorism’ as a criterion 
variable revealed a significant regression 
weight (β = .66; t(117) = 9.44, p < .001). Finally, 
a regression analysis with the predictors ‘reli-
gion of target group’ and ‘expected aggression 
potential’ that simultaneously predicted the 
criterion ‘attitudes toward terrorism’ revealed 
a signifi cant regression equation (R 2 = .49; 
F(2, 116) = 54.55, p < .001). Both the expected 
aggression potential (β = .58; t(117) = 8.16, 
p < .001) and ‘religion of target group’ (β = –.24; 
t(117) = –3.44, p < .01) reached a signifi cant 
regression weight. A Sobel Test revealed that 
the indirect effect of the independent variable 
(religion of target group) on the dependent 
variable (attitudes toward terrorism) via the 
mediator (expected aggression potential) was 
signifi cantly different from zero (Z = –3.44, 
p < .001). Hence, the unmediated β-coeffi cient 
for religion of target group on attitudes toward 
terrorism significantly decreased when the 
expected aggression potential was controlled 
for. Thus, the expected aggression potential 
mediated the effect of religion of target group 
on attitudes toward terrorism.
In sum, Study 1 confi rmed our expectations: 
German participants assumed Muslims to be 
more religious, more aggressive, more strongly 
identifi ed with their religion, and more accepting 
of terrorism than Christians. Furthermore, a 
mediational analysis revealed that participants 
expected Muslims to be more accepting of ter-
rorism because they were expected to be more 
aggressive than Christians. By contrast, intrinsic 
religiosity and importance of religious identity 
were not signifi cant mediators. In the next step, 
we investigated whether Muslims are indeed 
more intrinsically religious, more strongly 
identifi ed with their religion, more aggressive, 
and more supportive of terrorism than Christians 
by directly surveying Christians and Muslims via 
self-assessment.
Study 2
Muslims and Christians from the CIS were asked 
about their intrinsic religiosity, the importance 
of their religious identity, aggression potential, 
and their attitudes toward terrorism.
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of dependent 
variables as a function of target group (Study 1) or 
own religion (Study 2)
 Study 1 Study 2
 Implicit theories  Real attitudes 
 (target group) (own religion)
  
 Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
Intrinsic 6.12 4.65  5.03 4.92
 religiosityb (1.18)a (1.47) (1.97)  (2.40)
Religious  8.38 6.60  8.08 6.11
 identityc (2.14) (2.55) (3.17) (3.42)
Aggression  2.70 2.23 2.62 2.67
 potentiald (0.73) (0.63) (0.53) (0.51)
Attitude 4.11 1.55 1.25 2.96 
 toward  (3.03) (2.24) (2.54) (4.12)
 terrorisme   
Notes: a Standard deviations are indicated in 
parentheses. b Scale ranges between 1 and 9. 
c Scale ranges between 0 and 10. d Scale ranges 
between 1 and 5. e Scale ranges between 0 and 10.
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Method
Participants and design Participants were 
recruited in two nations of the CIS (Ukraine 
and Azerbaijan). Fifty-one (27 females and 
24 males, ages ranging from 17 to 84 years; 
M = 42.43, SD = 15.12) Christians (N = 27; age: 
M = 40.67, SD = 14.76) and Muslims (N = 24; age: 
M = 44.00, SD = 15.80) participated in Study 2, 
which was based on a 2 (religion: Christian vs. 
Muslim) × 4 factorial multivariate design with 
intrinsic religiosity, importance of religious iden-
tity, aggression, and attitudes toward terrorism 
as dependent variables.
Material and procedure Participants read 
instructions similar to those of Study 1. The 
only difference was that the present study 
focused on the participants’ own attitudes, 
rather than on stereotypes and expectations 
of Muslims and Christians. After having read 
the introduction, participants indicated their 
religious denomination. Subsequently, par-
ticipants answered a Russian translation of 
the same questions and scales used in Study 1; 
that is, a scale of intrinsic religiosity (α = .79; 
Feagin, 1964), aggression potential (α = .83; 
Buss & Perry, 1992), importance of religious 
identity, and attitudes toward terrorism. Finally, 
participants were informed about the aim of the 
investigation, thanked for their participation, 
and dismissed.
Results and discussion
A 2 × 4 MANOVA with religion of partici-
pants (Muslims vs. Christians) as a between-
participants factor, and intrinsic religiosity, 
importance of religious identity, aggression, 
and attitudes toward terrorism as dependent 
variables, revealed a signifi cant main effect for 
type of religion (multivariate F(4, 46) = 2.64, 
p < .05, η2 = .19). All means and standard de-
viations are reported in Table 1. Univariate 
follow-up analyses revealed that religious 
identity was more important to Muslims than 
Christians (F(1, 49) = 4.51, p < .05, η2 = .08). 
In contrast, no differences between religious 
groups were observed regarding intrinsic 
religiosity (F(1, 49) = 0.04, p = .85, η2 = .00), 
aggression potential (F(1, 49) = 0.12, p = .73, 
η2 = .00), and attitudes toward terrorism 
(F(1, 49) = 3.10, p = .09, η2 = .06).
Study 2 revealed that three of four implicit 
theories that Germans hold regarding Muslims 
(as compared to Christians) were without basis: 
Muslims did not report that they were more in-
trinsically religious, more aggressive, or more 
supportive of terrorism than Christians. How-
ever, Muslims reported that their religious 
identity is more important to them than did 
Christians. This result might have important 
implications for Muslims’ and Christians’ atti-
tudes toward terrorism as a political instrument: 
if a terrorist attack is conducted by a Christian 
perpetrator, then Muslims might experience 
strong religious identifi cation because they were 
threatened by a perpetrator with a different 
(Christian) religious affi liation. However, if a 
terrorist attack is conducted by a Muslim per-
petrator, then Muslims’ religious identifi cation 
might be less pronounced because the religious 
affi liation of the perpetrator matches with their 
own religious affi liation. In contrast, because 
religious identifi cation is less important for 
Christians than it is for Muslims, Christians’ 
religious identifi cation might be less affected 
by the denomination or religious affi liation 
of a terrorist. As a consequence, Muslims (be-
cause of the stronger religious identifi cation) 
might regard terrorism as less justifi ed if the 
perpetrators were Christians compared to if they 
were Muslims, whereas Christians’ perceptions 
of a terrorist attack (because of the less pro-
nounced religious identifi cation) might be less 
affected by the religion of the perpetrator. Study 3 
was designed to test this line of thought. 
Study 3
Muslims and Christians from the CIS read a 
description of a religiously motivated terrorist 
attack, which was either conducted by Muslim 
or Christian aggressors (i.e. threat to religious 
identity). Subsequently, participants indicated 
to what extent they were (a) religious, (b) iden-
tifi ed with their religion, (c) aggressive, and 
(d) to what extent they perceived the terrorist 
attack as justifi ed. Because of the higher im-
portance of religious identity, Muslims were 
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expected to regard terrorism as less justifi ed 
if the perpetrators were Christians than if they 
were Muslims. In contrast, Christians were not 
expected to be sensitive to the religious source 
of the attack. Furthermore, we expected this 
interaction effect to be mediated by importance 
of religious identity—and not by a greater 
aggression potential of Muslims compared to 
Christians—as was suggested by the results 
from Study 1 on Westerner’s implicit theories 
about Muslims.
Method
Participants and design Sixty (25 females and 
35 males, ages ranging from 18 to 67 years; 
M = 39.03, SD = 12.22) Christians (N = 30; 
age: M = 38.93, SD = 11.97) and Muslims 
(N = 30; age: M = 39.13, SD = 12.67) from the CIS 
participated in Study 3. The study was based on 
a 2 (religion of participants: Christian vs. Muslim) × 2 
(religion of terrorists: Muslim vs. Christian) factorial 
between-subject design.
Material and procedure First of all, participants 
received a description of a terrorist attack, which 
was conducted either by Muslim or Christian 
extremists. This description was formulated as 
a fi ctive newspaper article and contained the 
following information to be imagined by the 
participants:
Religiously motivated aggression and terrorism has 
increased over the last few years, and has become 
one of the most challenging social problems facing 
the modern world. In the following study, we want 
to investigate the effects of religiously motivated 
aggression on individuals’ cognitions and emotions. 
In order to prevent biasing your assessments, we 
have not named the location or date of the following 
description of a disastrous terrorist attack; needless 
to say, it was a tragic example of Muslim (Christian) 
aggression that was conducted in a major city in 
the CIS some months ago by Muslim (Christian) 
terrorists. Fourteen people lost their lives and 
many others were seriously injured. People in that 
city are still shocked and are desperately trying to 
reclaim a sense of normality in their lives. A letter 
from the terrorists revealed that Muslim (Christian) 
extremists, who approved of using force to further 
their religious agenda, were responsible for that 
terrorist attack.
Next, participants fi lled out the same scales and 
items as in the previous two studies: intrinsic reli-
giosity (α = .66), importance of religious identity, 
aggression potential (α = .86), and attitude to 
the terrorist attack. Finally, participants indicated 
their religious denomination, were debriefed, 
informed about the aim of the investigation, and 
dismissed. Please note that all participants were 
informed that the described terrorist attack was 
only fi ctitious and not real. It was also ensured 
that no participant left the study with negative 
emotions or mindsets.
Results and discussion
A 2 × 2 × 4 MANOVA revealed a signifi cant main 
effect for the factor ‘religion of participants’ 
(multivariate F(4, 53) = 4.53, p < .01, η2 = .26). 
All means and standard deviations are re-
ported in Table 2. Univariate follow-up analyses 
revealed that religious identity was more im-
portant to Muslims (M = 8.10, SD = 3.12) than 
Christians (M = 5.57, SD = 3.05), (F(1, 56) = 15.08, 
p < .01, η2 = .21). No further signifi cant differ-
ences were revealed by the univariate analyses 
(all Fs < 1.60, all ps > .21). 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of 
dependent variables as a function of participants’ 
own religion and the religion of perpetrators in 
Study 3
 Muslim Christian
 participants participants
  
 Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
 terrorists terrorists terrorists terrorists
Intrinsic 4.92 5.18 4.49 4.51
 religiosity b (2.14) a (1.04) (1.68) (1.56)
Religious  6.88 9.69 5.67 4.93
 identity c (3.71) (0.63) (3.35) (2.81)
Aggression 2.71 2.82 2.44 2.73
 potential d  (0.43) (0.39) (0.83) (0.66)
Attitude 3.29 0.85 1.27 1.93
 toward (3.80) (1.52) (2.19) (3.24)
 terrorism e
Notes: a Standard deviations are indicated in 
parentheses. b Scale ranges between 1 and 9. c Scale 
ranges between 0 and 10. d Scale ranges between 1 
and 5. eScale ranges between 0 and 10.
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Furthermore, the multivariate analysis re-
vealed a signifi cant interaction between ‘religion 
of participants’ and ‘religion of terrorists’ 
(multivariate F(4, 53) = 2.62, p < .05, η2 = .17). 
First of all, univariate follow-up analyses for the 
dependent variable ‘attitude towards terrorist 
attack’ revealed a signifi cant two-way interaction 
between ‘religion of participants’ and ‘religion 
of terrorists’ (F(1, 56) = 4.27, p = .04, η2 = .07). 
Muslims perceived terrorism to be less justifi ed 
if it was executed by Christian aggressors than if 
it was executed by Muslim aggressors (F(1, 28) 
= 4.77, p = .04, η2 = .15). In contrast, Christians’ 
attitudes toward terrorism did not differ as a 
function of whether the terrorist attack was 
executed by Christian or Muslim terrorists 
(F(1, 28) = 0.44, p = .51, η2 = .02). 
A second univariate follow-up analysis with 
the dependent variable ‘importance of religious 
identity’ revealed a signifi cant two-way interaction 
between ‘religion of participants’ and ‘religion 
of terrorists’ (F(1, 56) = 5.30, p = .03, η2 = .09). 
Muslims reported religious identity to be more 
important if the terrorist attack was conducted 
by Christian terrorists than if conducted by 
Muslim terrorists (F(1, 28) = 7.25, p = .01, 
η2 = .21). By contrast, no differences of import-
ance of religious identity were recorded for 
Christian respondents when the terrorist attack 
was conducted by Christian or Muslim terrorists, 
respectively (F(1, 28) = 0.42, p = .52, η2 = .02).
Mediational analyses Preliminary analyses 
revealed that only ‘importance of religious 
identity’ could be a potential mediator of the 
interaction effect of ‘religion of terrorists’ 
and ‘religion of participant’ on ‘justifi cation 
of terrorism’. The aggression potential and 
degree of intrinsic religiosity were not potential 
mediators. Because the simple effects analysis 
revealed that only Muslims’ attitudes toward 
terrorism were affected by information about 
the religious denomination of the terrorists, 
the following analyses for religious identity as 
a potential mediator were conducted only for 
Muslims.
A regression analysis with the predictor 
‘religion of terrorists’ and the criteria ‘justifi ca-
tion of terrorist attack’ revealed a signifi cant 
regression coeffi cient (β = .38; t(28) = 2.18, 
p = .04). In a second step, the predictor ‘religion 
of terrorists’ signifi cantly affected the expected 
mediator ‘importance of religious identity’ 
(β = –.45; t(28) = –2.69, p = .01). Third, ‘im-
portance of religious identity’ as a predictor 
and ‘justifi cation of terrorist attack’ as criterion 
also revealed a signifi cant regression weight 
(β = –.65; t(27) = –4.50, p < .001). Finally, a re-
gression analysis with the predictors ‘religion 
of terrorists’ and ‘importance of religious iden-
tity’ that simultaneously predicted the criteria 
‘justifi cation of terrorist attack’ revealed a sig-
nifi cant regression equation (R 2 = .43, F(2, 27) 
= 10.15, p = .005). Although ‘importance of reli-
gious identity’ received a signifi cant regression 
weight (β = –.60; t(27) = –3.66, p < .01), ‘religion 
of terrorists’ did not reach signifi cance (β = .11; 
t(27) = 0.68, p = .51). A Sobel Test revealed that 
the indirect effect of the independent variable 
(religion of terrorists) on the dependent vari-
able (justifi cation of terrorist attack) via the 
mediator (importance of religious identity) 
was signifi cantly different from zero (Z = 2.17, 
p < .03). Thus, importance of religious identity 
mediated the effect of religion of terrorists on 
the justifi cation of terrorism. 
General discussion
We found that Germans in Munich, Bavaria, ex-
pected Muslims to be more intrinsically religious, 
more aggressive, more strongly identifi ed with 
their religion, and more supportive of terrorism 
than Christians, and that assumed/expected positive 
attitudes toward terrorism were mediated by an 
expected higher aggression potential of Muslims 
(Study 1). However, direct surveys of Muslims 
and Christians in the CIS showed that these 
religious groups only differed with regard to the 
importance of their religious identity: Muslims 
reported a stronger identifi cation with their 
religion than did Christians (Study 2). From this 
result, we concluded that Muslims’ (relative to 
Christians’) religious identity is more strongly 
affected by the religion of a terrorist perpetrator, 
which could possibly result in different attitudes 
toward terrorism (Study 3). As expected, Muslims 
assessed a terrorist attack to be less justifi ed if 
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it was conducted by Christian extremists than if it 
was conducted by Muslim extremists. In contrast, 
Christians’ acceptance of a terrorist attack did 
not depend on whether the perpetrators were 
Christian or Muslim. Furthermore, this differ-
ence between Muslims and Christians was 
mediated by differences related to importance 
of religious identity: when importance of 
religious identity and the religion of perpetrators 
(Muslim or Christian) were considered together, 
only the importance of religious identity affected 
Muslims’ attitudes toward terrorism. Note that 
this result clearly contradicted the Germans’ 
implicit theory that Muslims favor terrorism 
because they are extraordinarily aggressive. 
Muslims’ attitudes towards terrorism did not 
depend on an increased aggression potential, 
but on their own religious identity. Please also 
note that increased religious identifi cation of 
Muslims did not lead to more justifi cation of 
Muslim aggression, but to lowered justifi cation 
of Christian aggression. This clearly contradicts 
implicit theories Westerners hold about Muslims 
(see Study 1).
Limitations
There were some limitations to our research that 
must be borne in mind. First of all, our samples 
were relatively small and thus not likely to be 
representative of Christians and Muslims else-
where, nor of perceptions held by Christians and 
nonreligious individuals elsewhere. Future re-
search should employ larger samples in order 
to improve our ability to generalize our present 
fi ndings. Second, although recent research 
revealed that Muslim youth in the USA are sig-
nifi cantly more religious than comparable non-
Muslim youth in the USA (Ahmed, 2004), there 
is doubt as to whether increased importance of 
religious identity is unique to Islam: other research 
has also shown that the centrality of religious 
beliefs in one’s life is a component of intrinsic 
religiosity and religious fundamentalism, and 
neither of these two constructs are particularly 
associated with a specifi c religious content or 
different religious denomination. For example, 
Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck (1999) have 
shown that the construct of religious fundamen-
talism operates similarly across religious and 
cultural contexts. Specifi cally, for both Ghanaian 
Muslims and Christians as well as for Canadian 
Christians, religious fundamentalism was posit-
ively correlated with right-wing authoritarianism 
and positively associated with negative attitudes 
toward homosexuals (see also Hunsberger, 1996). 
In addition, Burris and Jackson (2000) have 
demonstrated that, for a sample of Christians, 
intrinsic religious orientation was strongly 
correlated with religious group identifi cation. 
Intrinsically religious participants, whose 
religious self-perceptions concerning religious 
group membership were threatened, showed 
increased religious self-stereotyping. For these 
reasons, it is important to acknowledge that 
the results of the present studies—that illustrate 
stronger religious identifi cation among Muslim 
than among Christian participants—may be 
in part due to the context and/or small samples 
from which the participants were recruited. 
Hence, future research should further investigate 
whether different religious affi liations are asso-
ciated with differences in religious identifi cation 
by employing larger samples and different 
cultures. 
Third, Study 1 revealed that German partici-
pants perceived Muslims more negatively than 
they did Christians. This might still be due to 
evaluative ingroup/outgroup distinctions, be-
cause Muslims are considered an outgroup by 
both German unaffi liated persons and German 
Christians. Given that unfavorable attitudes 
toward religious outgroups are quite prevalent 
(Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999), it seems possible 
that social identity processes may still have been 
relevant to both groups. Fourth and fi nally, with 
regard to the fi ndings of Study 3, that Muslims 
viewed a terrorist attack as less justifi ed if the 
perpetrators were Christian rather than Muslim, 
we want to note the potential relevance of his-
torical and current inequalities between some 
countries that are predominantly Christian 
versus Muslim in shaping Muslims’ perceptions 
of the justifi ability of terrorist attacks. Hence, it 
would be a fruitful endeavor for future research 
to control potential (perceived) historical differ-
ences between Muslim and Christian countries, 
and their effect on perceived justifi ability of 
aggressive acts.
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Theoretical and practical implications
Because implicit theories are used to interpret 
and evaluate the social world (e.g. Hong et al., 
2001), guide social judgments, and inform social 
actions (e.g. Levy, 1999; Levy et al., 2001), these 
results might have important implications for 
understanding and social interaction between 
the Islamic and Western Christian world: the 
Western Christian world assumes Muslims to be 
more aggressive than Christians, and therefore to 
be more supportive of terrorism than Christians. 
As a consequence, Muslims might be regarded 
as potential aggressors threatening the Western 
world, which would lead to oppressive actions 
and preventive decisions such as military inter-
ventions (e.g. the war in Iraq, 2003, or the war in 
Afghanistan, 2001), economic embargoes (e.g. 
Iraq, 1991 to 2003) or interdictions of Islamic 
symbols (e.g. the interdiction of head scarves 
of Muslim women in German schools). Conse-
quently, Muslims interpret such actions by the 
Western Christian sphere to be a threat to their 
religious identity, which results in a different 
attitude toward terrorism. This, in turn, confi rms 
implicit opinions and stereotypes that Western 
people hold regarding Muslims, and results in 
further encroachments and restrictive actions 
against Muslims and Islamic countries. This 
line of thought illustrates how (unjustifi ed) im-
plicit theories about Muslims could lead to a self-
fulfi lling prophecy (e.g. Madon, Jussim & Eccles, 
1997; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968), maintaining 
or even intensifying a vicious circle. In order to 
break through this circle, the Western world 
should avoid threatening Muslims’ religious 
identity. For instance, it should be communicated 
that military interventions to fi nd terrorists (e.g. 
the Afghanistan war) are not meant to impair 
Muslims’ religious or cultural identity. To con-
clude, the present results suggest that it is im-
portant for Western Christian society to critically 
question its own stereotypic beliefs about Muslims 
in order to promote a better understanding and 
harmony between cultures.
Note
1. Please note also that 15–20 years ago, Christians 
in Ireland were using terrorism on a frequent 
basis as a political instrument. We investigated 
only perceptions and stereotypes of religious 
groups, and do not propose that attitudes toward 
terrorism are indeed specifi c to a 
certain religion or religious orientation.
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